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We are very grateful to Aidan McGlynn for his thoughtful and generous reply to our paper, 
“Epistemic Injustice and Indigenous Peoples in the Inter-American Human Rights System” 
(Townsend, D.L. & Townsend, L. 2021). He is right that our primary interest is in the “real 
examples” described, and that, in this and other papers, we have cast about for a fitting 
theoretical framework to capture the intuitive injustice involved in these cases—including the 
very framework McGlynn ultimately recommends to us, of “discursive injustice” (Kukla 2014).1  
 
As far as this paper goes, McGlynn’s chief complaint is that our invocation of “extreme 
testimonial injustice” is a misdiagnosis of the injustice involved in the main case we describe. 
Here we will respond briefly to the reasons he gives for this claim, before stepping back to 
consider a broader question raised by his comments, namely, the relation between “epistemic” 
and “communicative” frameworks for thinking about the ways in which the speech of 
marginalized groups and individuals is stifled, distorted and dismissed. 
 
Extreme Testimonial Injustice 
Our central example of testimonial injustice in the paper concerned the treatment of the 
testimony given by an Indigenous community (the Kichwa people of Sarayaku) to members of 
the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, who were adjudicating whether this community had 
been properly consulted in the lead up to the award of an oil drilling concession by the State of 
Ecuador.2 Our understanding of what transpired is that the Community, through its informal and 
formal spokespersons, made a series of assertions about the impact of the proposed oil drilling 
on their local environment, but these assertions were not taken up as such, but rather as claims of 
an altogether different sort. (Note that this understanding of the Sarayaku community’s 
testimony and its reception is highly defeasible; it is based only on the way these are recorded 
within the Court’s judgment.) 
 
																																																								
1 See our Townsend, L. & Townsend, D.L (2020) for discussion of these cases within the broadly 
2	Inter-American Court of Human Rights’ judgment in the case of Kichwa People of Sarayaku vs. State of 
Ecuador [2012] Series C No. 245.	
In order to make sense of the intuitive injustice in this case, we invoked Miranda Fricker’s (2007, 
140-141) idea of “extreme testimonial injustice” (henceforth ETI). ETI is what happens when 
the speaker’s testimony does not register with the “testimonial sensibility” of the hearer, with the 
result that they are not even recognized as making the sorts of claims for which a specific 
credibility judgment would be needed. The result is a “radical communicative dysfunction” that 
Fricker characterizes as a form of “silencing” (Fricker 2007, 140).  
 
McGlynn is doubtful about our attempt to make sense of the Sarayaku case using this notion of 
ETI, for two reasons. First, he argues that the case as described seems to lack a key feature of 
ETI, namely, that the speakers on the receiving end of such injustice must have been in some 
sense “dehumanized.” Second, he claims that that the features of the case that we do highlight do 
not support a diagnosis of ETI, but are, instead, simply features of regular (i.e., non-extreme) 
cases of testimonial injustice. Let us consider these two points briefly in turn. 
 
McGlynn contends that a victim of ETI must be in some sense “dehumanized”, yet there is 
nothing in our description of the Sarayaku case to suggest that this is how the Community is 
perceived by the Court. We are prepared to grant the latter,3 but would like to question whether 
ETI really must involve such a perception.  
 
Fricker herself says relatively little about ETI, offering it somewhat tentatively as a rival to the 
speech act theoretic framework of silencing developed by Jennifer Hornsby and Rae Langton 
(about which more below). In doing so, she focuses on the canonical scenario of silencing 
discussed by Langton and Hornsby, namely, the scenario in a woman’s attempt to refuse a man’s 
sexual advances is not given appropriate uptake by the man, owing to a pornography-influenced 
climate of sexual objectification. As far as this scenario goes, Fricker does claim that a 
“dehumanizing sexual ideology” produces a “massive advance credibility deficit”, with the result 
that “the man never really hears the woman at all—her utterance simply fails to register with his 
testimonial sensibility” (Fricker 2007, 140). But it is not obvious, at least not to us, that a similar 
kind of dehumanization of speaker must lie behind every instance of ETI. 
																																																								
3 Though we concede this here, we want to leave open the possibility that there is indeed something 
dehumanizing in the Court’s treatment of the Community’s speech. For it could be that what lies behind 
the misconstrual of the Community’s speech is a particular kind of “positive stereotype” (cf. Davis 2016) 
about Indigeneity, namely one which exoticises Indigenous individuals and communities as having a special 
mystical or spiritual connection to their natural environment. Such a stereotype is dehumanizing in the 
sense that it forces Indigenous speakers to speak with “the voice of distinction”: 
“Although marginalized knowers are invited to participate in epistemic exchanges, the invitation 
is extended to the individual only insofar as the individual satisfies a certain description (woman, 
person of color, sexual minority, and so on). […] One might say that she—the particular speaker 
in question—is not really invited to participate anyone who looks like her would do. She—the 
person—is still epistemically excluded, even as she—the woman, the person of color, the sexual 
minority—is asked to perform a specific act of epistemic labor.” (Davis 2016, 490). 
 
In previous work, McGlynn (2019) has drawn a stronger link between ETI and dehumanization, 
with reference to the analogy Fricker makes between “testimonial sensibility” and “moral 
sensibility”. A person’s moral sensibility is their perception of others as deserving of moral 
consideration and treatment. When another person “registers” within one’s moral sensibility then 
one is such as to see their welfare, their struggles, their (lack of) access to social resources and 
institutions, their moral demands, etc, as “inherently motivating and reason-giving” (McGlynn 
2021, 24)—one sees them, as Fricker puts it, “in moral colour” (Fricker 2007, 71). In a similar 
way, as McGlynn explains, a person’s testimonial sensibility is their perception of others as 
deserving of epistemic consideration and treatment: 
“Seeing a person in epistemic colour involves seeing them as more or less credible, 
where this involves a perceptual judgment which motivates me and gives me reason to 
respond doxastically in certain ways: believing what they say, forming a particular 
credence or suspending judgment, and so on.” (McGlynn 2019, 408) 
 
It is relatively easy to see how a failure to see another person in moral colour is associated with 
dehumanization. Indeed, such failures are plausibly both rooted in and productive of a 
dehumanizing ideology, which depicts members of certain groups as “sub-human.” But the link 
between seeing someone in epistemic colour and dehumanisation is less clear. For one thing, there 
are groups, such as very young children, as well as people with serious cognitive and 
communicative impairments, whose humanity is not in question, but whose claims may well not 
register with one’s testimonial sensibilities. For another, a failure to see someone in epistemic 
colour is arguably more domain-specific than the failure to see someone in moral colour—and 
hence may not be happily thought of as an all-or-nothing affair, targeting the person as such (as 
is implied by the language of dehumanization), but rather as something affecting some segment 
of the person’s discourse. This is how we tried to construe the Court’s treatment of the Sarayaku 
community’s testimony in our paper. Within a certain domain of discourse—the domain of 
scientific facts about the state of the natural environment—the Court fails to see the Community 
in epistemic colour, in the sense that, in this domain, they fail to see the Community as capable 
of making claims worthy of epistemic consideration. This need not involve any thoroughly 
dehumanizing ideology, yet it nonetheless strikes us as an extreme form of testimonial injustice.  
 
This takes us to McGlynn’s second point, which is that the features of the Sarayaku case we claim 
support a diagnosis of ETI actually do not provide such support, since they are features of 
regular testimonial injustice. One of these features is that the Court does not entertain questions 
of truth or falsity with respect to the testimony of the Sarayaku community, because of (as we 
put it) “a perceived utter lack of credibility in this domain” (Townsend & Townsend 2021, 150). 
McGlynn suggests that this is not special to ETI; the same goes for familiar, non-extreme cases 
of testimonial injustice, such as Fricker’s own “central cases” of testimonial injustice: the jury’s 
dismissal of Tom Robinson’s testimony in To Kill a Mockingbird, and the rejection of Marge 
Sherwood’s suspicions in The Talented Mr Ripley. Both Tom Robinson and Marge Sherwood have 
their testimony rejected precisely because they are viewed by the relevant hearers as utterly 
lacking in credibility in respect of the content of their testimony.  
 
We want to insist there is an important difference between these latter cases and the Sarayaku 
case, but we concede that our talk of “a perceived utter lack of credibility” obscures this 
difference. Tom Robinson’s testimony, like Marge Sherwood’s, does register with the 
“testimonial sensibilities” of the relevant hearers, in the sense that the implicit call it makes for 
epistemic assessment is recognized by them. Indeed, it must be so recognised in order for their 
testimony to be rejected. The way in which these speakers are not given their epistemic due is 
that they are assigned too little credibility by their hearers. Although their testimony registers as 
testimony, they are not believed when they should be—this is the nature of the testimonial 
injustice they suffer. But the Sarayaku case is different from this, we suggest, because the call for 
epistemic assessment implicit in the Community’s testimony is not even recognized, and so there 
is no question of their claims receiving deflated credibility. This testimony does not even rise to 
level at which an assessment of the speaker’s credibility is called for—and so it does not even 
receive the “honour” of being unfairly weighed and rejected. So it is not that Sarayaku 
community’s claims about their environment are systematically and unduly assigned less 
epistemic weight than they deserve, but rather that they not even recognised as claims to be 
assessed in that way.  
 
“Epistemic” and “Communicative” Models of Silencing 
So much for our response to McGlynn’s specific complaint that we may have misdiagnosed the 
intuitive injustice in the Sarayaku case. A perhaps more substantial and interesting question raised 
by McGlynn’s response to our article concerns the relation between different frameworks for 
thinking about silencing—and more specifically, whether the “epistemic” model of silencing 
provided by ETI is in competition with speech act theoretic models of silencing, such as the 
Austinian framework developed by Hornsby and Langton (Langton 1993, Hornsby 1995, 
Hornsby & Langton 1998), and the social normativist framework developed by Kukla (2014). 
Fricker herself clearly sets up ETI as a rival to such “purely communicative conceptions of 
silencing” (Fricker 2007, 141), so it is worth being clear that although we borrow the notion of 
ETI from Fricker, we see it as complementing, rather than competing with, a speech act theoretic 
account of silencing. This is why we have previously, without too much embarrassment, 
discussed the Sarayaku case within the Hornsby-Langton framework, and why we welcome 
McGlynn’s recommendation that we use Kukla’s (2014) framework of “discursive injustice” to 
bring out certain important features of the case that we have not emphasized here. 
 
Why then does Fricker consider the “epistemic model” silencing of involved in ETI to be a 
competitor to a speech act theoretic model? The speech act theoretic model she has in mind is 
the notion of “illocutionary disablement” developed by Rae Langton and Jennifer Hornsby. 
Langton and Hornsby endorse the Austinian claim that the successful performance of 
illocutionary acts requires hearer “uptake”, in the sense that the hearer must recognise what the 
speaker is up to—what sort of speech act they mean to perform. Silencing occurs when 
something (such as a widely held prejudice about members of a certain group) systematically 
interferes with the ability of hearers to recognize what speakers are up to with their words—
when it compromises what Hornsby calls “reciprocity.” So, in the canonical example of silencing 
discussed by Langton and Hornsby, a woman’s attempt to refuse a man’s sexual advances is not 
given uptake as refusal, because the man is in the grip of a stereotype about women, that they do 
not mean to refuse when saying ‘No.’ In this way the speech act of refusal can become 
“unspeakable” (Langton 1993) for certain women in certain situations.  
 
Fricker distinguishes her model of silencing from this one as follows: 
“On Hornsby and Langton’s account, silencing occurs prior to the moment at which a 
speaker’s credibility is at issue, for the silenced woman's problem is not that her 
interlocutor regards her word as so worthless that when she says ‘No’ he doesn't hear 
her; rather, his stance towards her in the context is such that she is prevented from (fully 
successfully) performing the illocutionary act of refusal in the first place. His silencing 
her does not turn on any epistemic attitude he might have towards her, for the whole 
question of her credibility simply does not arise. On their account, then, silencing does 
not feature as a form of testimonial injustice. By contrast, on the construal I have put 
forward, according to which there might be social climates in which women lack 
credibility so drastically for certain subject matters that their word fails altogether to 
register in male hearers' testimonial sensibility, we can see how silencing might take the 
form of an extreme testimonial injustice” (Fricker 2007, 141). 
 
Evidently Fricker wants keep the notion of “registering on a hearer’s testimonial sensibility” 
distinct from the notion of “uptake” as it features in the Hornsby-Langton approach to silencing. 
But it is not clear to us why these should be kept apart. A failure of someone’s words to register 
on one’s testimonial sensibility—that is, a failure to see that person in epistemic colour—seems 
to be exactly the sort of thing that would produce a failure of uptake. If I don't see you as capable 
of making the sorts of claims that call for epistemic consideration then your attempts to make 
such claims will not be recognized as such by me—and so, if my uptake is a condition on your 
successful performance of those claims, you will find yourself silenced. In this way, silencing of 
the Hornsby-Langton sort could indeed take the form of (extreme) testimonial injustice, and 
could indeed “turn on an epistemic attitude” of the hearer towards the speaker, provided we 
construe “epistemic attitude” broadly enough to include a failure to see the speaker in epistemic 
colour.  
 
In sum, we see no reason why ETI should not be integrated into a more general communicative 
framework of silencing, such as the one developed by Hornsby and Langton, or the one 
developed more recently by Kukla.4 This is because a hearer’s testimonial sensibility is intimately 
connected with their ability to give appropriate uptake.5 Returning to our own paper, this allows 
us embrace McGlynn’s suggestion to explore the Sarayaku case within a more speech act 
theoretic framework, like that of “discursive injustice,” without giving up our diagnosis of ETI. 
While this is not the place to develop this in full, a characterization of the Sarayaku case along the 
lines would run roughly as follows. There is a domain-specific insensitivity in the Court’s 
testimonial sensibility, that prevents them from taking up the Community’s testimony in the way 
it is meant and deserves to be taken up, and leads them to take it up as claims of an altogether 
different sort. As a result, the Community’s attempted assertions about the nature of its 
environment are distorted and transformed into assertions about its culture and world-view. 
Insofar as this exemplifies a pattern of distorted uptake, this contributes to an ongoing form of 
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